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"BECAUSE THE CONSTITUTION REQUIRES IT AND BECAUSE
JUSTICE DEMANDS IT":t
SPECIFIC SPEECH INJUNCTIVE RELIEF FOR TITLE VII
HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT CLAIMS
Cecilee Price-Huish*
Abusive speech often is used effectively by harassers in the workplace to
intimidate, terrorize, objectify, and humiliate their intended victims, thus helping to
secure and maintain social inequality in the workforce, especially among racial and
gender minority employees. Pursuant to the adoption of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, the United States Supreme Court, in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,
interpreted the statute's anti-employment discrimination mandate as imposing
liability for conduct or words in the workplace that have the purpose or effect of
interfering with an employee's work performance or of creating an intimidating or
hostile work environment. This Article argues that in order to rectify and prevent
socio-economic inequality often imposed by employers and co-workers through
hateful harmful words, speech that creates a hostile or abusive work environment
should be subject to specific speech injunctions that are restricted to the workplace.
Such prohibitions on the workplace use of specific words and phrases found to
contribute significantly to the creation of an abusive environment are justfied by the
remedial requirements of Title VII and, thus, would offer the best remedy when used
as a preventative and reparative tool to address both future and past abuse.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND .................................. 194
I. WHY THE WORKPLACE WARRANTS SPECIAL PROTECTION ............ 199
A . Captive Audience ........................................ 199
B. Insufficiency of the Chaplinsky Fighting Words Doctrine in
the W orkplace ........................................... 200
II. TITLE VII AND FINDING A HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT ............ 201
A. What Is a Hostile Work Environment? ........................ 201
B. The Sufficiently Severe or Pervasive Perplex ................... 201
t CHARLES WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE 178 (1985) (quoting
President Lyndon B. Johnson, speaking in support of passage of the Civil Rights Act of
1964).
* Cecilee Price-Huish graduated cum laude from the Southern Methodist University
School of Law in 1997. After completing law school, Ms. Price-Huish was an Associate at
the law firm of Andrews & Kurth, L.L.P. in Dallas, Texas. Ms. Price-Huish is currently a
full-time stay-at-home mom who writes and does legal contracting work in her spare time.
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
C. A Tri-Factor "Sufficiently Severe or Pervasive" Test ............ 203
D. The Objective/Subjective Person ............................ 203
III. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF .......................................... 205
A. Desirability of Injunctive Relieffor Title VII Claims ............. 206
B. Necessity of Specific Speech Injunctions ...................... 207
C. Individuation of Injunctive Relief ............................ 208
D. Potential Hurdles for Specific Speech Injunctive Relief ........... 209
E. The Secondary Effects Rule ................................ 210
F. A Model Specific Speech Injunction Based on
Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc ....................... 214
G. Inadequacy ofAlternative Approaches ........................ 215
IV. RECONCILIATION OF HARASSMENT LAW AND CONSTITUTIONAL
CONSIDERATIONS JUSTIFY SPECIFIC SPEECH INJUNCTIONS ............ 216
A. Harassment Law Promotes Democracy and Serves the Interests
of the First Amendment .................................... 216
B. The Right to Gainful Employment Is a Protected Liberty Interest ... 216
C. Economic Interests of States Validate Specific Speech Restrictions . 217
D. Substantive Due Process Considerations ...................... 219
E. Trivialization of Hostile Work Environment Claims Is Unfair
to Victim s .............................................. 220
CONCLUSION .................................................. 221
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
A primary "function of free speech... is to invite dispute[,] ... induce[]...
unrest, create[] dissatisfaction,.., or even stir[] people to anger."' Despite the
laudability of a constitutional guarantee designed to protect dispute-inciting, emotion-
charged, or even highly offensive speech, some courts have indicated that the
promise of free speech may not be absolute with respect to harmful, discriminatory
speech in the workplace. Perhaps drawing on the Supreme Court's language in
Hishon v. King & Spalding,2 in which the Court stated, "[i]nvidious private
discrimination.., has never been afforded affirmative constitutional protections,"3
some lower courts have issued speech-prohibiting injunctions pursuant to finding that
sexist or racist speech resulted in an abusive or hostile workplace.4 The willingness
Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
2 467 U.S. 69 (1984).
3 Id. at 78 (quoting Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 470 (1973)).
4 See, e.g., Harris v. International Paper Co., 765 F. Supp. 1509, 1527 (D. Me. 1991),
vacated in part, 765 F. Supp. 1529 (D. Me. 1991). After finding a hostile work environment
existed, the court in Harris ordered an injunction directing the employer to "[cease] ... any
policy.., or activity which perpetuates [or] condones ... racial harassment... including...
any and all offensive conduct and speech implicating considerations of race." Id. See also
Davis v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 858 F.2d 345, 350 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S.
1110 (1989). In Davis, the court took speech limiting measures by ordering Monsanto to
[Vol. 7:1
JUSTICE DEMANDS IT
of some courts to issue speech-restricting injunctive relief, juxtaposed with the
constitutional guarantee of free speech, reflects a growing consensus that the law of
equality and the right to unlimited free speech are on a collision course.5
In light of this potential collision, the question arises as to the reason courts
should ever restrict speech. The answer is simple: because of their contextual import
and emotive impact, words have power. Words alone have the power to intimidate,
terrorize, objectify, humiliate, ridicule, and marginalize their intended victims
without leaving so much as a scratch. Throughout history, words have been used
effectively as weapons to secure and maintain social inequality.6 This may be
especially true in the context of race or gender discrimination in the workplace. One
commentator has suggested that "[s]ocial inequality is substantially created and
enforced-that is, done-through words and images.... Elevation and denigration
are all accomplished through meaningful symbols and communicative acts in which
saying it is doing it."
7
With respect to constitutional guarantees, however, it would be difficult to find
a protected freedom that Americans guard more fiercely than the right to speak freely
the words of their choosing as promised in the First Amendment.8 Indeed, the
Supreme Court has asserted that, "we may and do assume that freedom of speech...
which [is] protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by Congress... [is]
among the fundamental personal rights and 'liberties."' 9 Although there may be
disagreement as to the scope and meaning of free speech, its preeminence in the
American psyche arises from notions of self-fulfillment, determinism, and individual
autonomy."0 While free speech is fundamental to the American experience, there are
situations in which individuals abuse the unchecked use of this freedom. Speech or
expression that is designed specifically to produce harmful effects on the listener or
viewer is evidence of such abuse that not only harms the intended victim, but also
harms democratic society as a whole."
"take prompt action to prevent.., bigots from expressing their opinions in a way that abuses
or offends their co-workers." Id.
See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS 71 (1993).
[T]he First Amendment has grown as if a commitment to speech were no part of
a commitment to equality and as if a commitment to equality had no implications
for the law of free speech-as if the upheaval that produced the Reconstruction
Amendments did not move the ground under the expressive freedom, setting new
limits and mandating new extensions ....
Id
6 Id. at 13.
7 Id. (second and third emphases added).
8 See U.S. CONST. amend. I. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government
for a redress of grievances." Id (emphasis added).
9 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
'o See FRANKLYN S. HAIMAN, SPEECH AND LAW IN A FREE SOCIETY 6-7 (1981).
'' See Kent Greenawalt, Insults and Epithets: Are They Protected Speech?, 42 RUTGERS
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Nowhere is this harm more evident than in the workplace. In an increasingly
diversified and integrated society, many workplaces are comprised of a mix of people
representing different races, religions, genders, and cultural backgrounds, who may
leverage their differences to coerce, intimidate, and terrorize minority status co-
workers by using harassing or abusive speech. 2 Speech that necessarily infringes on
L. REV. 287, 307 (1990).
If a principle of free speech assumes that the people are hardy or aims to help
them become so, perhaps coarse and even hurtful comments should be protected
in the rough and tumble of vigorous dialogue. But group epithets and slurs
designed to wound listeners are another matter. Being impervious to epithets
when one is a member of a privileged majority is much easier than when one
belongs to a reviled minority, and a general encouragement of civic courage may
be more likely if targeted racial and religious abuse is not allowed. Even
''courageous citizens" should not be expected to swallow such abuse without
deep hurt, and being the victim of such abuse may not contribute to hardiness in
ways that count positively for a democratic society.
Id (emphasis added). One noted critic of workplace harassment law acknowledges that the
right of free speech is not absolute; yet, he fears that limitations on speech in the workplace
will lead to more impermissibly extensive, far-reaching limitations. See Eugene Volokh,
Thinking AheadAbout Freedom of Speech and Hostile Work Environment Harassment, 17
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 305, 312 (1996) ( "Any time one recognizes a new exception
to free speech protection, one strengthens the argument that a future proposed exception
'should not be seen as breaking new ground."') (quoting David Benjamin Oppenheimer,
Workplace Harassment and the First Amendment, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 321,323
(1996)).
2 See, e.g., Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla.
1991) (granting injunctive relief for a female employee at a shipyard when male co-workers
and supervisors made remarks demeaning to women and posted in the workplace pictures of
women in sexually suggestive or submissive poses); Aguilar v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc.,
53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 599, cert. granted, 921 P.2d 602 (Cal. 1996) (granting injunctive relief to
Hispanic drivers at a rental car agency when managers routinely called the drivers derogatory
names and continually demeaned them on the basis of their race and national origin); Mari
J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 2320 (1989) (advocating legal sanctions against racist speech based on the effects of
such speech upon the victims); Oppenheimer, supra note 11, at 323-24 (arguing that Title VII
law, prohibiting much workplace harassment, is consistent with First Amendment free speech
protections); Suzanne Sangree, A Reply to Professors Volokh and Browne, 47 RUTGERS L.
REV. 595 (1995) (refuting claims that Title VII protections might have a chilling effect on
workplace speech and contending that there is a compelling need to prohibit sexual
harassment in the workplace); see also Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action
for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 136-49
(1982) (noting that individual harm from hateful, spiteful, threatening, or coercive words may
be manifest in humiliation, isolation, and self-hatred); Donald Downs, Skokie Revisited: Hate
Group Speech and the First Amendment, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 629, 672-74 (1985)
(discussing the constitutionality of a tort action for racial insult and a more general tort action
for emotional distress for the intentional use of speech to inflict a mental injury). In the
employment context, when there is little freedom to leave the situation or fight against an
[Vol. 7:1
JUSTICE DEMANDS IT
the rights and well-being of others, however, is not an absolute right, as evidenced
by the unprotected status of defamation, 3 fighting words, 4 and obscenity. 5 In the
employment context, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to carve out an equally
broad, generally applicable exception for discriminatory speech in the workplace.
This reluctance exists despite the uniqueness of the work environment and the
existence of federal statutes prohibiting workplace harassment, which are inclusive
of harassing speech that leads to abusive, intolerable working conditions. 6 As one
commentator observed, it seems that "the law of employment discrimination has been
developed outside the mainstream of ordinary free speech'jurisprudence."' 7
Perhaps the most significant recent development in employment discrimination
law has been the adoption of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964," which states
that it is "an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin." 9 The Supreme Court has interpreted this language to mean that
employers may be liable for speech that creates an abusive work environment2" or,
more specifically, for words that have the "purpose or effect of unreasonably
interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating,
hostile, or offensive working environment."'" It is important to note that the Court
has recognized that words alone may lead to a discriminatory hostile work
environment,22 if the offending words pervade the workplace and are so severe that
their continued utterance makes it extremely burdensome or impossible for the
intended victim to continue under the terms and conditions of his or her
employment.23 It is against this statutory and interpretive backdrop that the Court has
seen fit to put restrictions on free speech in order to prevent employees from being
subjected to a hostile work environment.
First, it must be noted that Title VII specifically provides for injunctive relief,
pursuant to a finding of a hostile work environment, if such an order is necessary to
prohibit continued abuse.24 Some courts have gone so far as to find that the judiciary
abusive supervisor, a speaker consciously may try to hurt, humiliate, or intimidate the victim
with little fear of reprisal. Certainly, such injury to an employee is likely to affect his or her
morale, performance, and productivity.
'3 See Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952).
'4 See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942).
'5 See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957).
16 See infra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
'7 KENT GREENAWALT, FIGHTING WoRDs 77 (1995).
's 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994).
'9 Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
20 See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986).
21 Id. at 65 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994)).
22 See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 18-22 (1993) (citing Meritor, 477 U.S.
at 64, 67).
23 See id at 21 (quoting Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65, 67).
24 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (1994); see also Amirmokri v. Baltimore Gas & Elec.
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has a duty to render relief that will eliminate past discriminatory effects, while
preventing similar discrimination from occurring in the future.25 Under this mandate,
injunctive relief, in many circumstances, may offer the best remedy when used as a
preventative and reparative tool against racist, sexist speech that creates a hostile
work environment.26 Additionally, the potential efficacy and conduct-deterrent effect
of injunctive relief should quell any constitutional concerns with regard to an
irreparable injury requirement and the doctrine of prior restraints,27 because Title VII
injunctive relief is designed to prevent past wrongs from recurring while attempting
to eliminate past discriminatory effects. Title VII thus should be compared to
liability rules because, like other forms of civil relief, injunctions simply control
conduct, namely discrimination-based harassment, through deterrence.2"
This Article will argue that, in order to promote the remedial certainty required
by Title VII and to rectify the social inequality often imposed in the workplace
through hateful, harmful words, speech creating a hostile or abusive work
environment should be subject to specific speech injunctions. These injunctions
would prohibit workplace use of specific words and phrases found to contribute
significantly to the creation of an abusive environment. Part I of the Article discusses
the reasons employees in the workplace warrant special speech-limiting protection.
Part II analyzes hostile work environment claims and the mechanisms through which
to categorize challenged workplace speech as severe or pervasive enough to be
deemed abusive. A flexible "objective person" standard that would allow for
subjective analysis based on gender or racial status should govern those
determinations. Part III considers the efficacy and desirability of specific speech
injunctive relief. This Section also resolves any conflict between such relief, the First
Co., 60 F.3d 1126, 1132 (4th Cir. 1995) ("The equitable relief available in Title VII
workplace harassment cases is an injunction prohibiting further harassment.").
21 See Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 737 F. Supp. 1202, 1216 (D.D.C. 1990), aff'd, 920
F.2d 967 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
26 See Aguilar v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 599, 614 (1996), cert.
granted, 921 P.2d 602 (Cal. 1996). The court in Aguilar used the following example to
illustrate the need for and usefulness of an injunction:
[Consider] for example.... a black laborer whose supervisor repeatedly calls
him a "nigger" at work. What can the employee do? Our colleague would tell
him: "Yes, your boss is being rude and impolite, but don't be so middle class;
remember that you are working in the vigorously physical, more frank and less
euphemistic workaday world. But if you insist on being culturally parochial and
doing something about it, short of punching him in the nose and getting yourself
fired, you can sue him. After a few years of litigation and thousands of dollars
in legal fees, you might recover some money. Just don't expect us to tell him he
can't call you a nigger at work anymore. We can make him pay, but we can't
make him stop. But don't worry: if he continues to call you a nigger, you can sue
him again!
Id.
27 See OWEN M. FisS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 6 (1978).
28 See id at 8-12.
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Amendment, and the prior restraints doctrine by applying the secondary effects
doctrine, which validates speech injunctions aimed at restricting illegal conduct such
as employment discrimination. Finally, Part IV contemplates the reconciliation of
hostile work environment claims and constitutional considerations to justify further
the issuance of specific speech injunctions.
I. WHY THE WORKPLACE WARRANTS SPECIAL PROTECTION
A. Captive Audience
In the employment context, unabridged free speech poses interesting problems
due to the unique nature of the workplace-namely, that employees are members of
a captive audience. A captive audience is essentially a group, or a member of a
group, that is unable reasonably to avoid exposure to harmful, offensive speech. In
Resident Advisory Board v. Rizzo,29 the court held that plaintiff employees were a
captive audience because they were "powerless to avoid bombardment by derisive
speech and noise"3 ° short of walking off the jobsite. "' Justice White, in his
concurring opinion in R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul,32 not only supported the notion of
captive audiences, but argued that when the target of hateful, harmful speech is a
member of a captive audience, proper regulations may restrict the speech to protect
the listener." "Although the First Amendment protects offensive speech, it does not
require us to be subjected to such expression at all times, in all settings. We have
held that such expression may be proscribed when it intrudes upon a 'captive
audience."' 34 When an employee is forced to make a choice between (1) being
subjected to a continuous barrage of racist or sexist epithets, or risking the loss. of her
job by walking out, retaliating, or (2) protesting against such speech, she is a member
of a captive audience for whom courts may proscribe speech.
Assuming that employees are members of a captive audience, the solution to
racist or sexist discrimination in the workplace cannot possibly be the "do nothing"
approach, which Molly Ivins has advocated.35 Certainly, the cure for the abusive uses
and harms of free speech in the workplace cannot be more unregulated use of hateful,
harmful, and destructive speech.36 The "do nothing" approach may be appropriate
29 503 F. Supp. 383 (E.D. Pa. 1976), modified, 564 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1977), and cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978).
30 Id. at 402.
"' See id.
32 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
33 See id. at 414 n.13 (White, J., concurring).
SId. (citation omitted).
3 See Molly Ivins, Havin' Fun Fightin' for Freedom, Address at The Sex Panic: A
Conference on Women, Censorship and "Pornography," New York Law School (May 7-8,
1993).
36 See id.
I need the First Amendment so that I'll be able to say to people who say things
I do not agree with, "Look, you yellow-bellied son of a bitch-you run on all
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for the general societal context in which a person can respond to sexist or racist
insults by either walking away or launching counter-insults or verbal attacks of their
own. The workplace, however, is not part of the naturally occurring world in which
people are completely free to associate with whom they please. Rather, it is an
unnatural construct in which very different types of people are required to work side
by side, simply in order to make a living or feed their families. Indeed, the workplace
is different.
B. Insufficiency of the Chaplinsky Fighting Words I)octrine in the Workplace
Many commentators point to the existence of the fighting words exception to the
right to free speech as adequate protection for victims of severe racist and sexist
speech in the workplace.37 The fighting words rule established in Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire,38 however, is not sufficient in the workplace because it requires the use
of such words that "by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an
immediate breach of the peace"39 before any substantive speech restrictions are put
in place. The odd result of this doctrine is that it only protects those who are likely
to react with violence, while it abandons those who are either unable or too scared
to fight back. As Kent Greenawalt rightly points out, it is highly improbable today
that any words would cause the average listener to respond with immediate
violence," especially in the workplace where the fear of dismissal for a violent act
is a powerful restraint. Professor Mari Matsuda supports this conclusion by
advocating that racist and sexist speech be treated as a sui generis category;4 one
which "present[s] an idea so historically untenable, so dangerous, and so tied to
perpetuation of violence and degradation of the very classes of human beings who
are least equipped to respond"42 that it should fall outside the realm of protected
discourse.
fours, you molest small children, you have the mind of an adolescent tyrant." I
need to ... be able to answer them back.
Id, quoted in NADINE STRossEN, DEFENDING PORNOGRAPHY 14 (1995). It is hard to believe
that this approach could really be the answer. Jan Douglas, director of the Community
Relations Commission for Atlanta has commented, "'[i]f blacks and Jews and other
minorities were similarly organized for harassment of and violence to whites, the nation
would be turning upside down."' Jan Douglas, Comments at the Open Meeting on Racial and
Religious Bigotry and Violence, Atlanta, Ga. (Sept. 24, 1981), quoted in Matsuda, supra
note 12, at 2375 n.268.
17 See, e.g., Ivins, supra note 35.
38 315 U.S. 568 (1952).
'9 Id. at 572.
40 See Greenawalt, supra note 11, at 297-99. "Suppose women, or members of a
particular ethnic group, are much less likely to fight than are men, or members of other ethnic
groups. That does not mean the listeners are less hurt when insulted." Id. at 299.




II. TITLE VII AND FINDING A HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT
Perhaps due to the "captivity" of workers and the inadequacy of the fighting
words doctrine (or any other meaningful workplace protection for racial minorities),
Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.41 Title VII states that it
is "an unlawful employment practice for an employer.., to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin." 4
A. What Is a Hostile Work Environment?
Despite the seemingly clear mandate of Title VII's language, the Supreme Court
took more than twenty years to recognize harassment-based hostile work environment
claims. In the landmark case of Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,4" the Supreme
Court held that employers could be held liable for speech that creates a hostile work
environment under Title VII. 41 In Meritor, the Court defined actionable speech as
"'[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or
physical conduct of a sexual nature . . . [that] has the purpose or effect of
unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment."' 47 Since Meritor, courts
have gone one step further and will now issue injunctions against actionable
workplace speech.48
B. The Sufficiently Severe or Pervasive Perplex
Following the Meritor majority's lead, the majority in Harris v. Forklift Systems,
Inc.49 attempted to give more substance and form to hostile work environment
claims." The Court in Harris held that a workplace permeated with discriminatory
behavior that is "sufficiently severe or pervasive" to create a discriminatory hostile
or abusive working environment violates Title VII.5 ' The Court reaffirmed its
41 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994).
4 Id. § 2000e-2(a)(l).
45 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
46 See id. at 64-65 ("The phrase 'terms, conditions, or privileges of employment' evinces
a congressional intent 'to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and
women' [and racial minorities] in employment.") (quoting Los Angeles Dep't of Water &
Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)).
" Id. at 65 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (a) (1985)) (emphasis added).
48 See, e.g., Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc.' 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla.
1991); Aguilar v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 599 (1996), cert. granted, 921
P.2d 602 (Cal. 1996).
49 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
0 See id. at 17-19.
5' Id. at 21-22 (citing Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64, 67).
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position in Meritor by requiring that a complainant demonstrate a hostile work
environment by showing "'discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult,...
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment"'52
permeates the workplace.
In its unanimous holding, the Court gave some definition to the words
"sufficiently severe or pervasive" by refusing to limit the discrimination-prohibiting
language of Title VII53 to a finding of economic or tangible discrimination or harm.54
The Court also emphasized that factfinders do not need to focus their attention upon
finding that the alleged victim suffered "concrete psychological harm," because Title
VII does not require proof of such harm:5"
Title VII comes into play before the harassing conduct leads to a nervous
breakdown .... Certainly Title VII bars conduct that would seriously
affect a reasonable person's psychological well-being, but the statute is
not limited to such conduct. So long as the environment would
reasonably be perceived, and is perceived, as hostile or abusive, there is
no need for it also to be psychologically injurious.56
Despite this additional guidance, the Court's continued adherence to the "sufficiently
severe or pervasive" standard has attracted criticism for being overly broad and vague
and, thus, leaving too much discretion in the hands ofjuries." The Court, however,
did not leave juries in an abyss but, rather, provided a non-exhaustive list of factors
5 Id. at 21 (quoting Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65, 67) (citation omitted).
s It is "an unlawful employment practice for an employer.., to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a)(1) (1994).
4 See Harris, 510 U.S. at 22-23.
5 See id at 22.
56 Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
" See id. at 24 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("As a practical matter, today's holding lets
virtually unguided juries decide whether sex-related conduct engaged in (or permitted by) an
employer is egregious enough to warrant an award of damages."). Yet, in his concurrence,
Justice Scalia admits that "what constitutes 'negligence' (a traditional jury question) is not
much more clear and certain than what constitutes 'abusiveness."' Id.; see also Eugene
Volokh, How Harassment Law Restricts Free Speech, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 563, 568 (1995)
("How can you predict whether ajury (perhaps a jury that's not that keen on Gauguin nudes,
for reasons entirely unrelated to sex discrimination) will indeed find the speech to be 'severe'
or 'pervasive,' or the environment 'hostile' or 'abusive'?"). Volokh argues that the vague
"severe and pervasive" standard has caused a chilling effect among employers who now take
all possible steps to make sure that they never engage in potentially actionable speech. See
Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA L. REv. 1791,
1812 (1992). Such self-policing is not judicially required, nor is it cause for alarm. It is not
suggested that employers and potentially-offending employees be barred from using hateful,
abusive, insulting, or racially and sexually derogatory speech on their own time. At most,
employers and employees would be prevented from using such hateful and abusive speech
during the mere 40 to 60 hour work week.
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that may contribute to, or be evidence of, "sufficiently severe or pervasive" abuse or
hostility in the workplace.5" In Harris, the Court found that a discriminatory abusive
work environment will often: (1) detract from employees' job performances; (2)
discourage employees from remaining on the job; or (3) keep them from advancing
in their careers.59 The Court should expound upon these factors, mentioned only as
dicta in Harris to formulate a more concrete test for the "sufficiently severe and
pervasive" standard. Doubts as to whether ajury could evaluate the alleged violative
conduct as "sufficiently severe or pervasive," using a test based on the above
mentioned factors coupled with findings as to "the frequency of the discriminatory
conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating... ; and
whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance,"' ignore
the reality that the judicial system entrusts juries to decide what constitutes
negligence, while armed with a standard that offers no more clarity than the proposed
tri-factor abusiveness standard from Harris.6 Even Justice Scalia has conceded this
glaring truth.62
C. A Tri-Factor "Sufficiently Severe or Pervasive" Test
In the interest of advancing a more consistent application and fairer results,
courts should adopt the Harris dicta as a tri-factor test for determining whether the
"sufficiently severe or pervasive" standard has been satisfied. In order to meet the
standard, the complainant would be required to demonstrate one or more of the
following factors: (1) hampered job performance, evidenced by lowered productivity
or unsatisfactory evaluations; (2) suppressed advancement opportunities, evidenced
by promotion stagnation or non-consideration; or (3)job dissatisfaction, evidenced
by lowered self-esteem, feelings of fear and intimidation in the workplace, or a desire
to quit or seek employment elsewhere because of the alleged harassment. Due to the
difficulty of divining job dissatisfaction, courts should measure the third factor by an
objective/subjective standard.
D. The Objective/Subjective Person
Unfortunately, in Harris, the Court adhered to the objective employee standard
elucidated in Meritor as a mechanism for preventing conduct that is "merely
offensive" from becoming actionable under Title VII.63 A more accurate standard for
58 See Harris, 510 U.S. at 23.
'9 See id. at 22.
60 Id. at 23.
61 See id. at 24 (Scalia, J., concurring).
62 See id. Justice Scalia stated that, if not for the language of the statute, he would favor
an absolute test to determine whether conduct is "sufficiently severe or pervasive" to create
a hostile or abusive environment: "whether the conduct unreasonably interferes with an
employee's work performance." Id.
63 See id. at 21 (O'Connor, J.).
Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile
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ascertaining the impact of alleged harassment and determining whether the
harassment caused job dissatisfaction, workplace fear, intimidation, or hampered
performance, however, would be the objective/subjective person standard adopted
by the Sixth and Seventh Circuits.64 In Brooms v. Regal Tube Co., the Seventh
Circuit directed district courts to
employ a dual standard when evaluating a Title VII sexual harassment
claim, considering the likely effect of a defendant's conduct upon a
reasonable person's ability to perform his or her work and upon his or her
well-being, as well as the actual effect upon the particular plaintiff
bringing the claim.
6 5
The Seventh Circuit reaffirmed the utility of an objective/subjective standard in
Daniels v. Essex Group, Inc.66 when it held that frequent racist invectives must create
both an objectively and subjectively abusive work environment to be found
actionable under Title VII. 67 This standard provides a safeguard that would prevent
courts from catering to frivolous or hypersensitive claims, while recognizing the
subjective element of language and conduct aimed at a member of a minority or
under-represented group. Following the Seventh Circuit's admonition, the court in
Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc.6' held that, in order for workplace speech
to be found to have created a hostile work environment under Title VII, a claimant
must satisfy the objective prong by showing pervasive or salient conditions of
discrimination in the work environment.69 Once a complainant satisfies the objective
prong, the Robinson court held that, under the subjective prong, the complainant
must show that she was "at least as affected as the reasonable person under like
circumstances."' The court's inclusion of "under like circumstances" seems to
envision a standard in which the "reasonable person" would share the complainant's
racial or gender status.7
or abusive work environment-an environment that a reasonable person would
find hostile or abusive-is beyond Title VI's purview. Likewise, if the victim
does not subjectively perceive the environment to be abusive, the conduct has
not actually altered the conditions of the victim's employment, and there is no
Title VII violation.
Id. at 21-22.
6 See Brooms v. Regal Tube Co., 881 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1989); Rabidue v. Osceola Ref.
Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
65 Brooms, 881 F.2d at 419.
66 937 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir. 1991).
67 See id. at 1273-74.
68 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
69 See id. at 1524. The court's language demonstrates the need for a clear standard to
determine whether the alleged conditions indeed are severe or pervasive enough to satisfy
objective harassment criteria. See supra text accompanying notes 59-61 (proposing a three
factor test for the "sufficiently severe or pervasive" standard).




The Seventh Circuit's objective/subjective interpretation of the standard set forth
in Harris recognized that reality and fairness demand a subjective analysis be used
in tandem with the application of objective criteria. Otherwise, the standard for
determining whether the alleged conduct is "sufficiently severe or pervasive" would
be a sham, because the "reasonable person" in a workplace is unlikely to be working
under the same circumstances as racial or gender minority employees who are often
the targets of discriminatory invective. Although the Seventh Circuit used the
objective/subjective standard, the Fifth Circuit rejected this standard in DeAngelis
v. El Paso Municipal Police Officers Ass 'n.72 The split between the circuits as to
what standard to apply is evidence that the Harris standard was too vague and did not
provide sufficient guidance to lower courts.
In DeAngelis, the court reviewed the hostile work environment claims of a
number of female police officers.73 Instead of viewing the speech and conduct from
the perspective of a reasonable woman in like circumstances, the Fifth Circuit
advocated apurely objective standard to determine the severity and pervasiveness of
the alleged wrongdoing.74 Commenting on the choice of this standard, the court in
DeAngelis stated that "[t]he test is an objective one, not a standard of offense to a
'reasonable woman."'75 Unfortunately, adherence to this type of rigid, reality-blind,
purely objective standard will severely stunt progress toward gender and racial
equality in the workplace. The objective/subjective standard set forth by the
Robinson court is both fairer and more equitable and will better serve the purpose of
Title VII, namely, the elimination of workplace discrimination.
III. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
Assuming a Title VII complainant is able to clear the hurdles of showing that
alleged workplace speech is severe or pervasive enough to create an abusive or
hostile work environment, the question remains, under both the proposed tri-factor
test and an objective/subjective person standard, as to what type of relief is most
appropriate. One option, the injunction, was the primary remedy in the early days of
civil rights litigation.76 Courtspresented with tasks such as desegregating schools,
used injunctions because other remedies could not address the problems as well.77
72 51 F.3d 591, 594 (5th Cir. 1995).
71 See id at 594.
74 See id.
71 Id. (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993)) (second emphasis added).
76 See FiSS, supra note 27, at 87-89. Fiss claims that Brown v. Board of Education, 347
U.S. 483 (1954), gave injunctive relief special prominence in the fight against discrimination:
"School desegregation not only gave the injunction a greater currency, it also presented the
injunction with new challenges, in terms of both the enormity and the kinds of tasks it was
assigned." Id. at 4. The injunction was the tool with which courts were to restructure
educational systems around the country. Id. The following argument validated the use of this
tool: if the use of injunctive relief was denied then the mandate of Brown would also be
denied-an impermissible result. Id. at 5.
77 See id at 87-88.
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Prospective injunctions were an ideal solution because they accommodated the group
nature of civil rights claims, provided specificity, and offered continued
supervision.78 These same reasons justify the usefulness of the injunction as a
remedy for hostile work environment claims under Title VII. When considering
enforcement and remedies, monetary damages may not always be the most
appropriate form of relief under civil rights legislation, including Title VII. 79 In
support of more liberal use of injunctive relief in the civil rights legislative arena,
Professor Owen Fiss advances three reasons why monetary damages may not be an
adequate remedy: first, there is very little deterrent effect on the very wealthy or the
judgment-proof; second, it arguably is impossible to place a monetary value on all
injuries; and third, it is impossible to compensate adequately prospective victims for
their fears.8°
A. Desirability of Injunctive Relieffor Title VII Claims
Once a claimant shows the existence of a hostile work environment, Title VII
clearly allows for injunctive relief as a necessary tool to prohibit further harassment.8
In successful Title VII actions, courts have gone so far as to say that the court has a
duty to render relief that will eliminate, as far as possible, the discriminatory effects
of the past and prevent similar discrimination from occurring in the future.82
Furthermore, judicial precedent leaves no question as to the validity of injunctive
relief as a proper remedy for racial or sexual discrimination that causes a hostile work
environment under Title VII.83 Injunctive relief is not only valid, under some
circumstances, it is the best, most efficacious form of relief because it serves as a
preventative and reparative tool against actionable racist, sexist speech.84 Professor
78 See id.
See id. at 75 ("My conceptual world has been shaped in large part by the civil rights
experience, and at the core of that experience is a conception of rights that denies their
reducibility to a series of propositions assuring the payment of money to the victims.").
80 Id. at 75-77.
8 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (1994); see also Amirmokri v. Baltimore Gas & Elec.
Co., 60 F.3d 1126, 1132 (4th Cir. 1995).
82 See Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 737 F. Supp. 1202 (D.D.C. 1990), aff'd, 920 F.2d
967 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
8 See EEOC v. Beverage Canners, Inc., 897 F.2d 1067, 1070 (1 1th Cir. 1990) (granting
injunctive relief to black employees for racist statements made by managers and coworkers);
EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504, 1518-19 (9th Cir. 1989) (granting injunctive relief
for persistent, sexually offensive remarks, which created a hostile work environment);
Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1534 (M.D. Fla. 1991)
(granting injunctive relief for frequent and continuous sexist speech that constituted sexual
harassment); Snell v. Suffolk County, 611 F. Supp. 521, 532 (D.C.N.Y. 1985) (issuing a
specific speech injunction that prohibited employees from using certain racial and ethnic
epithets), aff'd, 783 F.2d 1094 (2d Cir. 1986).
84 In a recent hostile work environment case, currently awaiting appeal to the California
Supreme Court, the California Court of Appeals remanded, and ordered the trial court to
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Fiss argues that there is no reason why courts should disfavor or subject the
injunction to restrictions such as the irreparable injury requirement and the doctrine
of prior restraints because courts do not apply such restrictions to other remedies.85
Reparative injunctions-those designed to prevent a past wrong from recurring while
attempting to eliminate past effects-are not comparable to damage awards or
criminal convictions, but rather to liability rules because injunctions influence
conduct through deterrence.86
B. Necessity of Specific Speech Injunctions
While the reparative and preventative functions of injunctions are fairly
established, there is an additional advantage to using specific speech injunctive relief;
namely, that such injunctions minimize the risks of over-breadth and vagueness that
can plague non-specific injunctive relief. Specific speech injunctions differ from
other more generic equitable relief. They explicitly list and prohibit the workplace
use of speech found to create a hostile work environment. Such injunctions may be
particularly effective because they put all relevant parties on notice of specific speech
that constitutes proscribable employment discrimination and, thus, serve as bright
guidelines for future speech and conduct. Specific speech injunctive relief, however,
is in no way meant to discourage the use of commonly used or commonly understood
words in the injunction such as "derogatory," "racial," "ethnic," "epithets," "sexist,"
"uninvited," "intentional," and "touching. '7 As one court stated, these are "not
words of art, are not technical or arcane, and are hardly obscure.""8 Additionally, the
proposed use of specific word exemplary lists should not be misunderstood to imply
exclusivity of terms, nor should judges be expected to anticipate every harmful,
derogatory term that might evoke a hostile work environment. A judge should
include, however, a list of those terms found actionable in a given case as exemplary
of prohibited speech. Although a defendant may attempt to circumvent the
injunction by using or creating new, impact-similar terms and phrases, the list will
offer context to both defendants and judges by which to measure the potential
discriminatory impact of subsequent speech.
Injunctions that provide exemplary lists of prohibited words not only offer
context to guide subsequent speech, they force society to acknowledge the
harmfulness of the violative words. They do not allow courts to hide behind a veil
issue a specific speech injunction against the defendants. See Aguilar v. Avis Rent-A-Car
Sys., Inc., 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 599, 610-11 (1996), cert. granted, 921 P.2d 602 (Cal. 1996).
85 See FISS, supra note 27, at,6.
86 See id at 8-9.
87 Aguilar, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 610.
88 Id. Recognizing the limitations of words, the Supreme Court has stated, "[i]t will
always be true that the fertile legal 'imagination can conjure up hypothetical cases in which
the meaning of [disputed] terms will be in... question,"' however, "[c]ondemned to the use
of words, we can never expect mathematical certainty from our language." Grayned v. City
of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 & n.15 (1972) (quoting American Communications Ass'n
v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 412 (1950)).
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of injunctive vagueness or inadequate relief and, thus, injunctions give sharper teeth
to the relief granted. Courts should not pat themselves on the back for issuing
"appropriate" injunctive relief to remedy hostile work environments while hiding
behind vague, meaningless language that, in effect, says no more than, "do good,
avoid evil." The victims of severe and harmful abusive speech in the workplace
deserve more than the type of injunction issued in Harris v. International Paper
Co.89 The injunction in Harris simply directed the employer to "[cease] . . . any
policy.., or activity which perpetuates [or] condones.., racial harassment[,] ...
including.., any and all offensive conduct and speech implicating considerations
of race."9 Courts must demonstrate a willingness to use, and thus defuses the
abusive, ugly words they intend to restrict. The explicit, frank, and specific
restriction of words such as "nigger" and "cunt" in injunctive orders, when
appropriate, will offer not only unprecedented clarity; it will rob such words of some
of their power, thus making the relief much more meaningful to both victims and
perpetrators.
On the other hand, critics argue that specific speech injunctions will result in
nothing more than meaningless restrictions on speech because the creative mind will
always find substitutions for words and phrases that are "off limits." An answer to
this criticism, however, may be the fact that specific speech injunctions need not
abandon the general language courts currently use, but simply augment that language
by offering non-exclusive lists of prohibited words. Those lists must state clearly that
courts intend the prohibited words to provide a context for determining whether other
words or phrases would violate the order. Admittedly, prejudice, hate, and ignorance
are attitudinal, rather than lexicological, character flaws. While neither Title VII, nor
injunctive relief allowed under the statute, can reform the attitudes of bigoted, sexist
individuals, Title VII can ensure that such individuals do not create hostile
workplaces for their intended victims by expressing those attitudes through abusive,
intimidating workplace speech.
C. Individuation of Injunctive Relief
In order for specific speech injunctive relief to pass constitutional muster and
affect the intended consequence of workplace equality, courts must individuate the
injunction.9 Three factors determine individuation: first, the injunction must address
a clearly identified individual; second, the injunction must describe the prohibited
conduct with specificity; and third, the injunction must identify the beneficiaries
specifically.92 The benefit of individuation is that it gives rise to more narrowly
tailored injunctions that, in turn, decrease the threat to due process by clearly
identifying the parties involved and providing adequate and clear notice of what
constitutes a violation. Narrowly tailored injunctions also disallow rote reliance on
9 765 F. Supp. 1509 (D. Me. 1991), amended by 765 F. Supp. 1529 (D. Me. 1991).
90 Id. at 1527.
91 See Fiss, supra note 27, at 12-13.
92 See id. at 12.
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broad statutory prohibitions such as "don't discriminate on the basis of race or
gende-." 93 As a result, use of these injunctions helps to avoid the unintended
consequence of courts proffering generalized decrees that will "not effectively
change the status quo."94 Issuance of specific speech injunctions, pursuant to a
finding of a hostile work environment, would achieve the goals of individuation:
first, courts would direct the injunctions to the person or persons who are found liable
for the actionable speech; second, courts would define the prohibited speech with
specificity and limit such prohibitions to the workplace; and third, the relief would
benefit specifically the victims of the actionable speech. One potential downside of
narrowly worded injunctions, however, is that individuals may evade them more
easily than broad commands.95
D. Potential Hurdles for Specific Speech Injunctive Relief
In addition to individuation, the irreparable injury requirement poses potentially
invalidating hurdles for specific speech injunctions.96 Professor Fiss, however,
criticizes reliance on the irreparable injury doctrine as a basis for determining when
injunctive relief is appropriate.97 The doctrine requires that, before courts may grant
injunctive relief, the plaintiff must show that no alternative remedy will repair
adequately the alleged injury.98 The problem with this standard is that it is riddled
with ambiguities. As Fiss states, "[i]t is not clear how inadequate-whether greatly
or slightly-the alternative remedy must be before an entitlement to an injunction is
established."99 Additional inadequacies of this standard include the retrospective
nature of a damage action, the interposition of an unpredictable jury, and, possibly,
the future financial unresponsiveness of a defendant in cases in which monetary
damages are awarded.100
The prior restraints doctrine also has handicapped unfairly the use of injunctions
that place limitations on speech.' This doctrine does not prevent the issuance of
injunctive relief aimed at speech but, instead, places a higher burden on restrictive
injunctions; namely, that the restricted speech must be unprotected in a dramatic,
clear, and special way.0 2 However, this strict burden does not hamper other types
of relief such as liability rules and criminal prohibitions that are aimed actually or
constructively at speech.0 3 As Fiss argues, injunctions are no different, in effect,
from liability rules and criminal prohibitions. They all may have a chilling or
9' Id. at 13.
9' Id. at 13-14.
9' See id.




0 See id at 39.
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deterrent effect on speech or conduct" and, thus, courts should not subject
injunctions to a higher burden. 5 To achieve greater parity in relief, courts should
lower the standard for limiting speech through injunctive relief in order to eliminate
discrimination-based harassment because such relief will be granted only when there
is evidence of prior misconduct.0 6
E. The Secondary Effects Rule
Despite the desirability, necessity, and statutory authority for court-ordered
specific speech injunctions to remedy hostile work environments, many courts still
are reluctant to issue such relief.'0 7 As previously discussed, concerns over
individuation and irreparable injury may not provide a sound basis for invalidation
of specific speech injunctive relief.' There may be lingering doubts, however, as
to the prior restraints doctrine. Yet, in Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc.,1 9 the Supreme
Court leveled a major blow against the prior restraints doctrine with respect to
speech-limiting injunctions."0 In Arcara, the Court held that a speech restriction
does not constitute an invalidating prior restraint if first, it is not directed at the
expressive content of the speech; and second, it does not eliminatesubstantially other
opportunities for such expression."' Additionally, in Roberts v. United States
'o See id. at 40, 69 (discussing the similarity between injunctions, liability rules, and
criminal prohibitions). Fiss states:
these instruments may induce silence just as effectively as an injunction.... But
the similarity between injunctions, liability rules, and criminal prohibitions, that
they all have a "chilling effect," seems to be lost when the Court turns to the
prior restraint doctrine and holds injunctions to a much more rigorous
substantive standard than the other prior restraints.
Id. at 69-70.
105 See id
106 See id at 68-70.
The mere fact that the injunction is a restraint on the defendant's liberty...
cannot count against it; for from one view of the case.., the defendant either is
about to or has already engaged in conduct that is both illegal and harmful. The
very purpose of the injunction is to stop that conduct or to correct its effects.
Id. at 68; see also Sangree, supra note 12, at 600. Although it has not been adopted by a
majority of the Court, at least one U.S. Supreme Court Justice has expressed his opinion that
"injunctive relief should be judged by a more lenient standard than legislation ... [because]
injunctions apply solely to an individual or a limited group of individuals who [have engaged
in] illegal conduct." Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 788 (1994) (Stevens,
J., dissenting)).
107 See, e.g., Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla.
1991) (granting an injunction that did not specify the prohibited speech).
'o See supra notes 9 1-100 and accompanying text.
109 478 U.S. 697 (1986).




Jaycees,'12 the Court stated that "potentially expressive activities that produce special
harms distinct from their communicative impact.., are entitled to no constitutional
protection."' 3
Roberts and Arcara were just a prelude to the final blow to the prior restraints
doctrine being used as an invalidating factor against specific speech injunctions as
remedies for hostile work environments. In short, the Supreme Court's explicit
recognition of the secondary effects rule in R.A. V v. City of St. Paul"4 should
ameliorate concern over invalid prior restraints. Stated succinctly, the secondary
effects rule "permits, as content-neutral regulation, a prohibition of conduct that is
not targeted on the basis of its expressive content."' 5 Thus, under R.A. V., courts may
circumscribe speech or expression if the restriction is based on the secondary effects
of the speech rather than the content." 6 "[S]ince words can in some circumstances
violate laws directed not against speech but against conduct.., a particular content-
based subcategory of a proscribable class of speech can be swept up incidentally
within the reach of a statute directed at conduct rather than speech."" 7
It seems that, in R.A. V, the Court gave the green light to the idea that racist or
sexist speech, which is severe and pervasive enough to create a hostile work
environment," l8 is tantamount to "discriminatory conduct" as proscribed by the
employment discrimination provisions in Title VII. 19 Once they classify it as
conduct, courts may enjoin the speech as constituting illegal conduct.' When
insults and epithets are hurled at an employee, such abusive remarks may thus
amount to conduct-based, situation-altering utterances.' While the language of both
Title VII 122 and the Harris123 opinion focus on prohibiting behavior and conduct that
112 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
".. Id. at 628 (citing Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1976)). This language
is the basis for much of the hate speech theory propounded by Richard Delgado. See
generally Delgado, supra note 12 (proposing a tort action for hate speech based on the
psychological, sociological, and political effects of the speech).
114 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
" Aguilar v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 599, 608 (1996), cert. denied,
921 P.2d 602 (Cal. 1996). "Where the government does not target conduct on the basis of
its expressive content, acts are not shielded from regulation merely because they express a
discriminatory idea or philosophy." R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 390.
116 See R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 390.
117 Id. at 389.
118 See id at 382-87.
"9 See Aguilar, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 606-09 (accepting the distinction between conduct and
content). But see DeAngelis v. El Paso Mun. Police Officers Ass'n, 51 F.3d 591, 596-97 (5th
Cir. 1995) (rejecting the distinction between conduct and content, and denouncing the
application of Title VII's language in R.A. V. as unilluminating, offhand pronouncements).
120 See Aguilar, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 606-09, 612. f
121 See Greenawalt, supra note 11, at 292 (arguing that the situation-altering aspect of
speech is more important than the message conveyed about the qualities or attributes of the
person who is being verbally attacked); see also supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text
(discussing the ability of words to be vehicles of discriminatory conduct).
22 It is "an unlawful employment practice for an employer.., to discriminate against any
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amount to discrimination, R.A. V. paved the way, with the secondary effects doctrine,
for courts to recast abusive speech as discriminatory conduct that may be subjected
to proscriptive speech restrictions. "
The Court in R.A. V even seems to have anticipated specific speech injunctive
relief under Title VII, a statute directed at prohibiting certain conduct, namely,
employment discrimination on the basis of race, gender, etc." 5 Speaking for the
majority, Justice Scalia stated, "for example, sexually derogatory 'fighting words,'
among other words, may produce a violation of Title VII's general prohibition
against sexual discrimination in employment practices."'2 6 By including the phrase
"among other words," the Court seemingly expanded the secondary effects rule to
encompass "any speech that creates an abusive work environment in violation of the
law of employment discrimination."'2 7 The Court's discussion of the severe and
pervasive use of sexist epithets constituting employment discrimination that "can be
swept up incidentally within the reach of a statute directed at conduct rather than
speech" applies with equal force to the use of racist invective in the workplace. 8
The secondary effects rule should have a substantial impact on the type of relief
granted for hostile work environment claims. In fact, Justice White's concurring
opinion in R.A. V. implied that the Court specifically intended the secondary effects
rule to preserve hostile work environment claims. 9 The California Court of Appeals
used the secondary effects rule to validate the imposition of a specific speech
injunction in the ground-breaking case, Aguilar v. Avis Rent-A-Car System, Inc. 3'
In Aguilar, the court stated, "although racist epithets 'express a discriminatory idea
or philosophy,' that of racial supremacy, their pervasive use in the workplace is not
shielded from regulation under Title VII ... because the target of the regulation is
the secondary effect of such conduct-employment discrimination-not its
expressive content."3' Although the defendant in Aguilar argued that the "'emotive
impact of speech on its audience is not a 'secondary effect,""..32 the court looked at
individual with respect to his compensation, term, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a)(1) (1994).
23 Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 19-22 (1993) (discussing the way words may
lead to a discriminatory, hostile work environment and, thus, violate the Title VII prohibition
of discriminatory conduct).
124 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 389 (1992) (discussing the secondary
effects of harmful speech).
125 See id.
126 Id. (emphasis added).
127 Aguilar v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 599, 608 (1996), cert. granted,
921 P.2d 602 (Cal. 1996).
28 Id. at 606 (quoting R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 389).
129 See R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 409-10 (White, J., concurring).
130 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 606-08.
131 Id. at 607 (citation omitted).
132 Id. (citing R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 394 (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988))).
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the speech through more expansive lenses.'33 "Such speech has more than an
emotive impact. By altering the conditions of employment, as adult motion picture
theaters alter the conditions of a neighborhood, such speech crosses the line between
constitutionally protected expression and proscribable discriminatory conduct."' 34
In Aguilar, the plaintiffs were a group of seventeen Hispanic drivers at Avis' San
Francisco airport location. 3 The plaintiffs sued Avis on hostile work environment
grounds, claiming that the managers subjected them to "'discriminatory intimidation,
ridicule, and insult' . . . that [was] 'sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
conditions of [their] employment.'" 36 The plaintiffs complaint alleged that Avis
managers at the San Francisco location routinely called the plaintiffs derogatory
names and continually demeaned them on the basis of their race and national
origin.'37 In response to a jury finding that the defendants' conduct was sufficiently
severe and pervasive to alter the conditions of employment, the trial judge granted
an injunction ordering the defendants to "'cease and desist from using any derogatory
racial or ethnic epithets directed at, or descriptive of, Hispanic/Latino employees of
Avis ... [and to] further refrain from any uninvited intentional touching of said
Hispanic/Latino employees."" 38
A problematic feature of the trial judge's injunction, however, was that it
restricted the defendants' speech beyond the workplace. Nevertheless, on appeal, the
court upheld the injunction based on a finding that the defendants did indeed subject
a number of the plaintiffs to a "continual barrage of opprobrious racist invective"' 39
that resulted in a hostile work environment".' The Court of Appeals, however,
declined to modify the injunction directly, but reversed and remanded the injunctive
portion of the judgment, directing the trial judge to: (1) redraft the injunction,
limiting its scope to the workplace; and (2) add an exemplary list of prohibited
derogatory racial epithets, specifying those previously used in the workplace by the
defendants. 4 ' The court pointed to Snell v. Suffolk County'42 as an example of how
to fashion specific speech injunctive relief.'43 In Snell, the court issued an injunction
specifically requiring a jail warden to forbid the use of the following words by
corrections officers in the workplace: "'nigger,' 'polack,' 'kike,' 'spic,' 'guinea,'
'honky,' 'mick,' 'coon,' and 'black bitch' (all of which [had] been used on the job
by correction officers in recent years)."'44 The injunction also forbade the posting or
133 See id
134 Id.
' See id. at 602.
136 Id. at 602 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)).
117 See id
138 Id. at 603.
139 Id. at 604.
140 See id
".. See id. at 614.
142 611 F. Supp. 521 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), affd, 782 F.2d 1094 (2d Cir. 1986).
41 See Aguilar, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 605-06.
144 See Snell, 611 F. Supp. at 532.
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distribution of derogatory bulletins, cartoons, and other written material, as well as
any racial, ethnic, or religious slurs.'45
The Aguilar court's focus on the secondary effects of severe or pervasive racist
speech as discriminatory conduct that altered the conditions of the victim's
employment 46  recognized the socio-economic realities of employment
discrimination. Discriminatory conduct, when evidenced by proscribable speech,
affects more than the listener's ego or feelings. Ultimately, the results of
continuously abusive, harmful. speech will be demonstrated by decreased job
performance, inability to advance, employment stagnation, and attrition of minority
race and gender status employees.'47 Once employment discrimination has been
identified correctly, however, the secondary effects rule can restrict such speech. If
an ensuing specific speech injunction, designed to remedy hostile work environment,
is limited to the workplace, and the provisions of the injunction are narrow and
specific, as evidenced by an exemplary list of prohibited words, it is likely courts will
find that the injunction "burden[s] no more speech than necessary to serve the
significant government interest in proscribing employment discrimination.' 48
F. A Model Specific Speech Injunction Based on Robinson v. Jacksonville
Shipyards, Inc. 149
In Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc.,5' the court found that Jacksonville
Shipyards violated Title VII by maintaining and subjecting six female skilled
craftworkers to a sexually hostile work environment.' The court found that some
male employees subjected female employees to daily attacks of visual sexual
harassment during which the men hung pictures of women with exposed genitals or
breasts, some engaged in sexual acts or masturbation, in work areas or community
locker rooms.' Often the women were also targets of verbal abuse, including such
statements as "[h]ey pussycat, come here and give me a whiff,"' 153 and "[t]he more
you lick it, the harder it gets.' 54 At the shipyard, it was also commonplace for
sexually explicit graffiti, like thephrase "lick me you whore dog bitch,"' 55 to appear
on the walls of women's work areas. Due to the egregious nature of the conduct at
Jacksonville Shipyards, the court found it necessary to fashion both negative and
145 See id.
46 See Aguilar, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 606-08.
'4 See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993).
148 Aguilar, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 612 (citing Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753
(1994)).
"' Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
150 Id.
'5' Id. at 1540.
152 Id. at 1494-99.
113 Id. at 1498.
154 Id.
5 Id. at 1499.
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affirmative relief.'56 While the injunctive relief granted was a step in the right
direction, the Robinson injunction was too vague--specifically the Court did not
delineate the prohibited speech,' 57 as the court in Aguilar proposed. I"8
Borrowing from the record in Robinson, the following injunction is a model
specific speech injunction that would offer more appropriate, meaningful, and
contextual relief to the victims in that case:
Jacksonville Shipyards is ordered immediately to cease any policy,
activity, or omission that allows, perpetuates, or condones sexual
harassment. Furthermore, Jacksonville Shipyards, and all employees
thereof, are ordered immediately to refrain from using any abusive,
hostile, or harmful speech that is directed toward female employees or is
spoken in the presence of female employees that implicates considerations
of sex or gender in the workplace. Any workplace use of, or reference to,
the following words, through speech or any other form of verbal or non-
verbal communication, will be considered violative of this order: cunt,
whore, bitch, dick. This list is a non-exclusive list that is meant to
provide guidance and context in determining whether other words are
violative of this order. This injunction also prohibits the workplace use
of any other words, through speech or any other form of verbal or non-
verbal communication, that a reasonable person could reasonably
understand to invoke or incite similar meaning, communicative import or
emotive impact as the explicitly prohibited words.
G. Inadequacy ofAlternative Approaches
On the opposite end of the spectrum, Eugene Volokh proposes a solution very
different from specific speech injunctions that would limit workplace speech
restrictions to only those situations involving one-to-one speech.' Volokh suggests
that speech may be restricted without interfering with a speaker's ability to reach
other willing listeners "[w]hen the only listener is one who doesn't want to hear."'160
Volokh, thus, would shield from harassment law speech restrictions all workplace
communications, including posters, newsletters, and conversations that take place in
group areas or group settings in which the listeners are either mere members of a
larger listening group, or are presumptively "willing listeners."' 16' There are practical
obstacles, however, with Volokh's proposal. It is possible that statements made to
156 See id. at 1534-39 (enjoining the defendant from engaging in or permitting further
sexually harassing behavior and affirmatively enjoining the defendant to adopt a sexual
harassment policy).
'57 See id. at 1541.
'5 See Aguilar v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 599, 610-11 (1996), cert.
granted, 921 P.2d 602 (Cal. 1996).
9 Volokh, supra note 11, at 311.
160 Id. (emphasis added).
161 1,4
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a group constructively may be one-to-one communication in fact if the intent of the
speaker is to send a message to a particular person in the group, as was the case in
Robinson.'62
In Robinson, male workers continually subjected female shopworkers to sexually
derogatory and threatening statements made in large groups of people that consisted
primarily of male co-workers.163 In one such instance, the record stated, "Hawkins
[male] humiliated Banks [female] by stating in front of a large group of male
coworkers, 'if you fell into a barrel of dicks, you'd come up sucking your thumb. '1"16
Another group attack occurred when a male co-worker sniffed a plaintiff's behind in
front of a group of male co-workers as she walked up a gangway. 6 Because these
events took place in group settings, Volokh would oppose proscribing such
comments and behavior through injunctive relief. It seems, if courts adopt Volokh's
one-to-one proposal, female employees such as those in the Robinson case, would be
expected either to: (1) endure abusive and intimidating comments and behavior
regardless of their severity or pervasiveness; or (2) anticipate such comments and
effectively remove themselves from the harassing situation-not a very realistic
option in the workplace.
IV. RECONCILIATION OF HARASSMENT LAW AND CONSTITUTIONAL
CONSIDERATIONS JUSTIFY SPECIFIC SPEECH INJUNCTIONS
A. Harassment Law Promotes Democracy and Serves the Interests of the First
Amendment
As previously discussed, workplace harassment law has developed outside "the
mainstream of ordinary free speech jurisprudence." '66 Yet, as one commentator
suggests, the commitment to equality through the adoption of civil rights legislation
necessarily may have some implications for speech law and may require the setting
of new limits or new extensions.'67 This Article contends that specific speech
injunctions are precisely the type of new limit on free speech that courts should
permit in order to effectuate the purposes of Title VII. One commentator has
advanced a novel argument as to how specific speech injunctions and the First
Amendment may be reconciled. Suzanne Sangree suggests that, rather than harming
162 See Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1500 (M.D. Fla.
1991). Indeed, insulting or intimidating discriminatory speech merely gains more power and
venom when delivered to the intended victim in front of her co-workers. See Delgado, supra
note 12, at 143.
163 See Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1491-1501.
164 Id. at 1500.
165 See id
166 GREENAWALT, supra note 17, at 77; see also MACKINNON, supra note 5, at 71.
167 GREENAWALT, supra note 17, at 77.
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or infringing upon free speech protections, hostile work environment relief, including
injunctions, serves the interests of a free democracy.'68 She states,
the First Amendment interest in promoting citizens' participation in the
polity is served by enabling women [and other minorities] to participate
on more equal terms in the economy. Just as equality is the foundation
of a free economy, so is equality the foundation of democracy.... Speech
which effectuates discrimination in employment undermines First
Amendment interests by imposing economic coercion which
disadvantages women solely on the basis of gender.'69
This argument seems to suggest that, in order to be a participant in democratic self-
governance, racial and gender minorities must be granted a place at the economic
opportunity table-a place that only can be reserved absent a discriminatory hostile
work environment.17
0
B. The Right to Gainful Employment is a Protected Liberty Interest
By validating that the right to earn a living is an essential liberty interest, the
Supreme Court has substantiated further the pluralistic, economic equality
justification for specific speech injunctions. Sangree adroitly points out that the
"'law compels [a person] to starve if [s]he has no wages, and compels [her] to go.
without wages unless [s]he obeys the behests of some employer,"' 7 which
obedience may include endurance of hostile or abusive speech. Commenting on the
right to work, the Court stated in Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong172 that the "right to
work for a living in the common occupations of the community is of the very essence
of the personal freedom and opportunity that it was the purpose of the [Fourteenth]
Amendment to secure.' It would be hard to find a more powerful argument
equating the right to work unhampered by discrimination as a protected liberty
interest-one that affords individuals the freedom and opportunity to partake of all
their constitutionally-protected freedoms. One commentator has equated the right to
earn a living with the right to free speech:
68 See Suzanne Sangree, Title VII Prohibitions Against Hostile Environment Sexual
Harassment & the First Amendment: No Collision in Sight, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 461, 558-60
(1995).
169 Sangree, supra note 168, at 559-60 (citation omitted). A differing view is that speech
restriction "neither treats citizens as autonomous and rational nor accords them the dignity
and equal status they warrant under a democratic government." Greenawalt, supra note 11,
at 289.
70 See Sangree, supra note 168, at 558-60.
.. Id. at 485 (quoting Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-
Coercive State, 38 POL. SC. Q. 470 (1923)).
172 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
3 ld at 102 n.23 (quoting Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915)).
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It is not surprising that [judges and professors] would view freedom of
expression as primary to the free play of their personalities. But most
men would probably feel that an economic right, such as freedom of
occupation, was at least as vital to them as the right to speak their mind.
74
This economic right to freedom of occupation can only exist absent harassing
workplace discrimination and intimidation.
C. Economic Interests of States Validate Specific Speech Restrictions
Limitations on speech that creates a hostile work environment should not be
viewed as pet projects of legal scholars and judges. In addition to Supreme Court
recognition of the right to gainful employment as a protected liberty interest, 7 and
society's interest in fostering an inclusive democracy and participatory equality in the
workplace, which collectively demand placing some speech limiting restrictions in
the workplace where necessary, states' interests in economic growth and productivity
also weigh in favor of limitations. Permitting unabridged free speech in the
workplace that has the potential to create a hostile work environment does not
promote the societal goal of a productive working class. The reality is that those who
face the extreme conditions posed by a hostile work environment ultimately will find
their employment intolerable and will leave in order to escape the infliction of further
psychological harm or intimidation. The result of such workplace departures could
lead to lower productivity and higher welfare and unemployment rolls. As the
entitlement payor, therefore, the state has an economic interest in promoting non-
hostile employment conditions.
D. Substantive Due Process Considerations
Narrowly circumscribed restrictions on hostile, abusive speech in the workplace
also will safeguard the constitutional "right to be let alone," which at least one
Supreme Court Justice has stated as being the "right most valued by civilized
men."' 76 The privacy right to be left alone is one that must extend beyond bodily
integrity to the spheres of emotional and psychological integrity. The fact that
Congress adopted Title VII, with its promise of appropriately applied relief to remedy
the abusive effects of workplace discrimination,' 77 gives rise to an expectation
interest.7 8 Through this statutory scheme, the government must ensure that
'71 See Robert G. McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An
Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 34, 46 (1986).
171 See Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897) (holding that "liberty" as intended by
the Fourteenth Amendment includes an individual's right to live and work where he or she
will).
176 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
17 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1994).
171 See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (ordering the state of South Carolina to
pay Adell Sherbert, a member of the Seventh Day Adventist Church, unemployment benefits
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employees retain the "right to be [psychologically] left alone."'79 In the employment
context, courts must weigh the combined effects of(1) an individual's liberty interest
in earning a living, (2) the desire to maintain personal dignity, and (3) the
fundamental right to be free from the psychological harms of discriminatory
harassment against the interests of other employees to engage in free, albeit hostile
or abusive speech.
8 1
Substantive due process demands the achievement of equality for racial and
gender minorities in the employment context.'8' Inequality, fostered by the existence
of an unremedied hostile work environment, is simply unjust and counterintuitive to
the normative notions upon which the Constitution is premised. Owen Fiss has
argued that injunctive relief in the context of civil rights legislation, "permits us to
look at the injunction through a different substantive lens-a belief that the
underlying claim-to achieve equality for the racial [gender] minority-is just. It
invites us to imagine that the substantive claim could be just.' ' 82
The Court juxtaposed substantive due process concerns with the captive audience
doctrine 81 in Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville'" and held that in order to protect the
after she was fired for refusing to work on her Saturday Sabbath). The Court in Sherbert
found that there was a compelling interest that justified the extension of state benefits to
protect Ms. Sherbert. Id. It would be hard to imagine that the Court would mandate extension
of state guaranteed benefits in Sherbert, but then refuse to intervene or offer protection under
Title VII to an employee whose gender or racial status provides the impetus for speech that
creates an intolerable work environment. Title VII, at the very least, is a statute that provides
a framework under which freedom from a hostile work environment has become a state
guaranteed entitlement.
' See Delgado, supra note 12, at 143.
Immediate mental or emotional distress is the most obvious direct harm caused
by a racial insult. Without question, mere words, whether racial or otherwise, can
cause mental, emotional or even physical harm to their target, especially if
delivered in front of others or by a person in a position of authority.
Id. (citations omitted).
180 In analyzing a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim, an individual
must assert an interest in life, liberty, or property. Both the right to earn a living and the right
to be left alone are recognized liberty interests. These interests, however, must be balanced
against the state's interest in maintaining a free and democratic society, which in this context,
includes the uncricumscribed use of free speech in the workplace. See Caroline Louise Lewis,
The Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration
Act: An Unconstitutional Deprivation of the Right to Privacy and Substantive Due Process,
31 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REv. 89, 102 (1996) (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 314-
25 (1982)).
.8. See generally FISS, supra note 27 (noting that courts have viewed the injunction as an
"extraordinary" remedy because, in part, of its past use against labor and Progressivism, and
arguing that, because the goal of achieving equality for racial minorities is just, the civil
rights injunction should not be subordinate to other remedies).
82 Id. at 6 (emphasis omitted).
183 See supra notes 29-36 and accompanying text.
184 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975).
1998]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
privacy rights of unwilling recipients of certain intrusively offensive speech, the
government selectively may "shield the public from some kinds of speech on the
ground that they are more offensive than others... [when] the degree of captivity
makes it impractical for the unwilling viewer or auditor to avoid exposure." '85 The
Court in Erznoznik invalidated a city ordinance that prohibited the screening of
movies containing nudity at drive-in theaters because the ordinance sought to keep
the films from being shown in places where offended viewers readily could avert
their eyes." 6 The Court found "[i]n short, the screen of a drive-in theater is not 'so
obtrusive as to make it impossible for an unwilling individual to avoid exposure to
it."""7 This is not the case in the workplace where an employee assigned to a certain
task, or station, or working under an offending supervisor cannot readily remove her
ears from the harassing situation.
In upholding speechrestrictions on substantive due process grounds, the Court
has relied upon a narrowly-tailored compelling interest test. In Burson v. Freeman,
188
the Court upheld an election day prohibition of political speech within 100 feet of
polling stations on the basis that the government had a compelling interest in
protecting the constitutional right to vote. ' 9 The prohibition was limited in its scope,
and in no way limited political participants' abilities or rights to engage in political
speech at other times and in other contexts. This is not so different from a workplace
specific speech injunction in which the government has a compelling interest in
guaranteeing that its citizens have the opportunity to take advantage of the liberty
interest of engaging in gainful employment, free from the debilitating effects of a
discriminatory hostile work environment. Specific speech injunctions would offer
necessary relief to remedy past discriminatory practices, while working to achieve
racial and gender equality in the workplace. Yet, like the prohibition in Burson, they
would be limited in scope by being restricted to the workplace and by providing, with
specificity, an exemplary list of actionable words.
E. Trivialization of Hostile Work Environment Claims Is Unfair to Victims
Finally, detractors of harassment law attempt to minimize important issues that
the recognition and remedy of hostile work environment claims promote, such as,
workplace equality, advancement opportunity, economic freedom, and freedom from
severe psychological harm or intimidation. 9 ' Instead, they attempt to skew the
debate by focusing on extreme cases and independent employer-mandated, non-
"' Id. (citations omitted). See also Jessica M. Karner, Political Speech, Sexual
Harassment, and a Captive Workforce, 83 CAL. L. REv. 637, 679 (1995) (noting that the
government has the ability "'to shut off discourse' in response to the privacy rights of
unwilling recipients of the speech) (quoting Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 210).
8.6 See Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 212.
"' Id. (quoting Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767, 769 (1967)).
188 504 U.S. 191 (1992).
'89 See id. at 211.
"' See, e.g., Volokh, supra note 57, at 564-66.
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judicial decisions. 91 While extreme examples do exist, they are probably more
representative of the growing pains of an evolving area of the law, rather than
evidence of a definitive trend. The fact that the same bad actors make recurring
appearances in the scholarship of harassment law critics reinforces this conclusion.
Unfortunately, the critics' backlash against harassment law progress adds insult to
injury for the victims of severe and pervasive discrimination, such as the parties in
the Robinson, Aguilar, and Turner cases.' In short, the detractors seem quite
alarmed by perceived judicial activism that simply does not exist in the
discrimination law context.
CONCLUSION
Racist or sexist speech that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
conditions of a victim's employment, when evidenced by satisfying an element of the
proposed tri-factor test,193 creates a hostile work environment and, as such, the
offending speech should be subject to a specific speech limiting injunction. The
secondary effects doctrine, as explained in R.A. V v. City of St. Paul, '94 lends support
for this proposition by providing for conduct-based speech restrictions, thus,
ameliorating concerns regarding prior restraints. The Court in R.A.V. actually
seemed to anticipate application of the secondary effects doctrine to remedy hostile
work environments when it included a workplace sexual harassment hypothetical in
'9' See id Professor Volokh cites Brown Transp. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 578 A,2d 555,
562 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990), in which the state court found that an employer who put
religious articles in the employee newsletter and Bible verses on employee paychecks was
liable for religious harassment. Id. at 564 n.3. Another one of Volokh's favorite examples is
a situation that did not even involve a lawsuit or judicial intervention, but involved a
Kentucky human rights agency that prompted a company to change its "Men Working" signs
by alleging that the signs perpetuated a discriminatory work environment. See Volokh, supra
note 57, at 565 (citing Andrew Wolfson, All Worked Up... Phone Company Called to Task
Over Gender-Based Signs, LOUISVILLE COURIER J., Mar. 3, 1994, at IB). Finally, there is the
oft-cited situation in which an employer ordered a graduate student who had a photo of his
wife in a bikini on his desk to remove the photo. Again, this situation did not involve a
lawsuit or any judicial intervention. See id at 566-67 (citing Nat Hentoff, A "Pinup" of His
Wife, WASH. POST, June 5, 1993, at A21).
192 Volokh ignores, or mentions only in passing, egregious cases in which extremely
harmful, hateful speech is used in the workplace against those in minority positions, for
example: (1) the continued and pervasive use of words such as "cunt," "whore," and "bitch,"
directed at female plaintiffs in Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486,
1497-98 (M.D. Fla. 1991); (2) the sustained use of racial epithets in Spanish, as well as use
of the words "wetbacks" and "motherfuckers" by a manager to Hispanic employees in
Aguilar v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 599, 606-08 (1996), cert. granted,
921 P.2d 602 (Cal. 1996); and (3) the persistent use of anti-Semitic comments and holocaust
jokes made by a supervisor to a Jewish employee in Turner v. Barr, 806 F. Supp. 1025, 1028
(D.D.C. 1992). See Volokh supra note 57, at 564-69.
193 See supra Part 1I. C.
194 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
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the text of the opinion. 9 ' Additionally, because courts would be required to
individuate the proposed specific speech injunctive relief, such inclusion should
quell any concerns regarding due process or vagueness because such relief would:
(1) specifically target those whose conduct is to be restricted; (2) specifically
delineate the proscribable conduct by listing words that are "off limits" in the
workplace; and (3) specifically identify the class of employees that the injunction is
meant to protect. Finally, listing prohibited words in an injunction would provide
contextual guidelines with which to determine the actionability of future speech,
while defusing some of the power of those words by sending a message that certain
words, good or bad, may not be co-opted by bigoted, sexist individuals to use as their
own exclusive weapons of subordination. While it is true that free speech may help
teach a healthy tolerance of differences,' specific speech injunctions would not be
aimed at curbing thought, attitudes, or even speech outside the limited forty to sixty
hour-a-week, artificial construct known as the workplace.
'95 See id at 389-90 ("Thus, for example, sexually derogatory 'fighting words,' among
other words, may produce a violation of Title Vll's general prohibition against sexual
discrimination in employment practices." (citation omitted)).
'96 See Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace
Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1243-44 (1989).
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